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Comments and Casenotes
EQUITABLE SERVITUDES - THE RUNNING OF
COVENANTS IN EQUITY
McKenrick v. Savings Bank of Baltimore1
Plaintiff by written agreement sold to the defendant a
lot of ground 100 by 160 feet at the southeast corner of
Reisterstown road and Slade Avenue in Baltimore. The
vendor agreed to convey the property by a "good and mer-
chantable" title, the defendant refused to perform, main-
taining that the land was encumbered by restrictions. A
common grantor formerly owned land on both sides of
Slade Avenue of which this lot was a part. Over a period
of years, he had made the following conveyances: North of
Slade Avenue (1) a lot to W. with restrictions which would
"apply to the whole tract of land" owned by the vendor
north of Slade Avenue; (2) A conveyance to L. with addi-
tional restrictions; (3) A grant to F. with some similar and
some different restrictions. South of Slade Avenue he had
made: (1) A conveyance to N. which the parties agreed
would run with the land conveyed; (2) A conveyance to
Leys with similar restrictions; (3) A grant to M. with
restrictions which differed from those of the N. and Leys
grants. Held: The plaintiff's lot was unencumbered, and spe-
cific performance should be granted. (1) The prior grants
do not show the existence of any uniform plan of develop-
ment; (2) The only restrictions which apply to any of the
land south of Slade Avenue are those in the grants to the
south; (3) These deeds show an intention on the part of
the grantor to confine the restrictions to the lots actually
conveyed by him.
In considering the various perplexing problems relating
to covenants running with the land, a distinction must be
made between covenants which are said to run with the land
at law, and those restrictive agreements which will be
enforced in equity.
Legal covenants may be divided into those between les-
sor and lessee, and those created incidentally to conveyances
in fee. As the name implies, covenants are basically con-
tractual obligations under seal. Although no specific words
are necessary for their creation, a seal is indispensable in
I McKenrick v. Savings Bank of Baltimore, 197 At. 580 (Md. 1938).
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those jurisdictions which have not abolished its use.' In
the majority of jurisdictions today, when the grantee ac-
cepts a sealed instrument signed by the grantor, he implied-
ly accepts the seal of the grantor and the covenants con-
tained therein.' On the other hand, a few jurisdictions
including Maryland require the instrument to be signed and
sealed by both parties. Thus a deed poll, is ineffectual to
bind the grantee' to covenants the burden of which rests on
such grantee.
The rules regulating the running of covenants at law
were enumerated in Spencer's case," wherein three funda-
mental requirements were set out: (1) There must exist
"privity of estate" between the covenantor and covenantee;
(2) the covenant must touch and concern the land; and (3)
if the covenants relates to something not in existence, it
must expressly bind the assigns. The vagueness of these
criteria has led to many conflicting opinions in their appli-
cation. Each will be treated here in the order set out above.
The lessor-lessee relationship presents no problem of
"privity of estate". This continuing tenure relationship
produces a constant privity. The burden attaches to the
leasehold estate, and the benefit to the reversion, or the
converse may be true. In conveyances in fee, the continu-
ing tenure is absent. Although meeting this requirement
was originally attended with difficulty, most jurisdictions
have held that an instantaneous privity exists between the
grantor and grantee when the conveyance is made, and that
if the covenants are created at that time, they simultaneous-
ly attach to that privity and enure to subsequent assignees.'
Covenants created several days later have been held not to
attach.'
When does a covenant "touch and concern" the land?
This presents a problem difficult to determine, and impos-
sible of solution unless the nature of the rights of the
covenantee and the obligations of the covenantor are kept
clearly in mind. These rights and obligations can be divided
into two groups: Those relating to contract rights, and
2 Tiffany, Outline of Real Property, 349.
Ibid; Midland Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 125 Ind. 19, 24 N. E. 756 (1890);
Sexaner v. Wilson, 136 Iowa 357, 113 N. W. 941, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 185
(1907).
' Dawson v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 107 Md. 70, 68 Atd. 301, 14 L. R.
A. (N. S.) 809, 126 Am. St. Rep. 337 (1907). As shall be noted later, this
is not essential for equitable relief.
5 Spencer's Case, 5 Coke 16; Glenn, Ex'r., v. Canby, 24 Md. 127 (1866):
but see Union Trust Co. v. Rosenburg, 171 Md. 409, 416, 189 Atl. 421; noted
(1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 320.
(1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 320.
Wheeler v. Sehad, 7 Nev. 204 (1871).
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those which exist because they attached to the privity of
estate. These can be illustrated by a recognized and com-
monplace covenant-the covenant of the lessor to convey to
the lessee upon the fulfillment of specified conditions. The
contract right is apparent. A duty exists on the part of the
lessor which creates a right in the lessee. How does this
touch and concern the land? The contract duty creates a
burden on the lessor's reversionary estate as it is subject
to divestment. Correspondingly, the right created in the
lessee operates as a benefit to the leasehold estate because
it can be enlarged. Thus it can be seen that the burden
"touches and concerns" the reversionary estate while the
benefit "touches and concerns" the leasehold estate.
The burden or the benefit may run independently of the
other. The burden may be in gross, while the benefit runs
with the land or vice versa.' This proposition is illustrated
by covenants on the part of the grantee not to engage in a
competing business. The burden has been held to run with
the land conveyed, while the benefit remains in gross. It
has been reasoned that the benefit remains personal inas-
much as it touches only the financial and not the physical
advantage of the land.' Maryland -in a similar case has
taken the contrary and more sound view that both may run
with the land."0
Whether a covenant "touches and concerns" the land is
determined in Maryland by the following test laid down in
Glenn v. Canby," " . . . a covenant to run with the land
must extend to the land so that the thing required to be
done will affect the quality, value or mode of enjoying the
estate conveyed, and thus constitute a condition annexed or
appurtenant to it . . ." In Whalen v. Baltimore & Ohio
R. R." this rule was construed, without discussion, to allow
to run a covenant to maintain a railroad siding and one to
take up and set down passengers, but a covenant to set off
railroad cars for the purposes of unloading was held not t9
run. A covenant to maintain a public station was held not
to run because the advantage to the land was merely inci-
dental. 8
The third rule of Spencer's case, that if the covenant
relates to something not in esse, it must expressly bind the
'Clark, Covenants and Interests Running With the Land, 80.
Shade v. O'Keefe, 260 Mass. 180, 156 N. E. 887 (1927).
10 Clem v. Valentine, 155 Md. 19, 141 Atl. 710 (1928).
11 Supra, note 5, 24 Md. 127, 130.
12 108 Md. 11, 69 At. 390, 129 Am. St. Rep. 423, 17 L. R. A. (N. S.) 130
(1908).11 Md. and Pa. R. R. Co. v. Silver, 110 Md. 510, 73 Ati. 297 (1910).
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"assigns", has lost much of its importance. A number ofjurisdictions have expressly failed to recognize it, while
others have minimized its effect by holding that, if upon
the face of the whole agreement the intent is to bind the
assigns, the court will give it that effect. The rule has met
with favor in Maryland at law; and, as will be noted later,
under some circumstances in equity. However, a definite
modification is seen in Union Trust Co. v. Rosenburg.4
If both the burden and benefit of a covenant run with
the land, the rights and liabilities of the parties are easily
seen. As the covenantor's obligation is contractual, he
always remains liable for any breaches whenever they occur.
The assignee of the covenantor is liable only for breaches
occurring during his ownership of the estate. After he has
assigned, there no longer exists privity of contract or estate
upon which to attach his liability. The covenantee can en-
force the obligations for breaches occurring only while he
owns an estate in the land. After he assigns the land, his
contract rights pass to the assignee.15
Restrictive agreements may be divided into three groups:
First, those enforceable both at law and in equity; second,
those enforceable only at law;16 and, third, those enforce-
able only in equity.
In this discussion only the third type will be considered.
This type of restrictive covenant or agreement concerns
itself principally with the intent of the parties, as it is
usually obvious that the covenant does touch and concern
the land. The question of privity of estate in the technical
and legal sense is absent, since the doctrine is well estab-
lished that equity is not fettered by the technical require-
ments which beset courts of law in giving effect to cove-
nants affecting land. 7 This principal is aptly phrased in
the leading case of Tulk v. Moxhay15 wherein it is stated
" ...The question is not whether the covenant runs with
the land, but whether a party shall be permitted to use the
it Supra, note 5. The Court cites with approval from 15 C. J. 1244:
"The rule which now seems sustained by the better reasoning, as well as
by the weight of authority, is that where a covenant is of such nature and
character that it may run with the land, the words 'heirs and assigns' are
not controlling if it can reasonably be inferred from the language of the
Instrument that the parties Intended that the covenant should run with
the land."
15 As to the necessity of bringing suit in equity if the covenantee-assignee
fails to bring suit until after he has assigned, see Donelson v. Polk, 64 Md.
501, 2 Atl. 824 (1885) ; and a criticism (1937) 1 Md. L. Rev. 320.
10 Supra, note 12.
17 Newbold v. Peabody Heights Co., 70 Md. 493, 17 Atl. 372, 3 L. R. A. 579
(1888).
1" 2 Phillips 774 (1848).
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land in a manner inconsistent with the contract entered into
by his vendor, and with notice of which he purchased."
Several theories have been advanced by courts of equity
in enforcing restrictive agreements which will not sustain a
suit at law. The view most widely adopted is that such
restrictions are equitable easements or servitudes. 9 The
extent to which equitable easements are in the strict sense
interests in land is questionable. Some jurisdictions have
held oral as well as written agreements are enforceable in
equity. This view would probably not be followed in Mary-
land. Agreements restricting the use of land have been held
in Maryland to be within the scope of the provisions of our
recording statute.2" Recording is not essential if there be
actual notice, and, unless the restrictions are incorporated
into the deed, there is no provision for their separate re-
cording. Yet, it is well settled that memorandum indepen-
dent of the deed is sufficient to impose the restrictions if
the purchasers take with notice.2 ' It also seems that equit-
able easements are enforceable in the absence of the gran-
tee's signature. If a purchaser takes with notice, restric-
tions will be etiforceable against him "however created." 2
Whether equitable easements are property interests
requiring compensation for their violation in condemnation
proceedings has not been uniformly decided. New York has
held such interests are property rights23 entitled to com-
pensation, while Ohio and California24 have considered them
mere contract rights, and not within the purview of consti-
tutional provisions providing compensation for seizure of
private property for public use. The New York view,
sounder in theory, may be less desirable on the grounds of
public policy. That an electric railroad company by run.
ning cars over one corner of a large subdivision should com-
pensate every owner, however remote, does not seem
desirable.
However the majority of the cases confronting the courts
have not concerned the quality of the interest created. Most
of the problems resolve around the questions of who, may
create the covenants, who may be bound by them, and what
is essential that they be enforceable inter sese by subse-
quent grantees. A grantor may convey property and impose
19 Thruston v. Minke, 32 Md. 487 (1870).
"Art. 21, Sec. 1. Lowes v. Carter, 124 Md. 678, 93 Atl. 216 (1915).
' Newbold v. Peabody Heights Co., 8upra, note 17.
2 Ringgold v. Denhardt, 136 Md. 136, 110 Atl. 321 (1920).
23 Flynn v. N. Y., W. & B. Ry. Co., 87 N. Y. 311, 119 N. El. 913, Ann. Cas.,
1918B, 584 (1916).
1, Doan v. Cleveland Short Line Ry., 92 Oh. St. 461, 112 N. E. 505 (1915).
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restrictions on the part conveyed without imposing similar
restrictions upon himself in such manner as not to bind the
land retained. On the other hand, he may bind both the land
conveyed and that retained in such manner that the mutual
benefits and obligations will be enforceable between subse-
quent grantees."
The fact that a covenant may be a benefit or a restric-
tion upon adjoining land is alone not sufficient to bind sub-
sequent grantees of the adjoining tracts. A clear intent
must be shown that the restrictions are intended not merely
for the benefit of the immediate parties, but for the benefit
of the land itself. 8 Intention is a matter of fact to be
proved by the rules of evidence, and the intention of the
parties will not be presumed.27 The soundness of this rule
is not open to question, and the importance of intention be-
comes even more essential when considering enforcement
inter sese among a number of lot owners. However, this
emphasis on intention may be reflected in two ways. The
first relates to the intention of the parties as to whether the
burden or benefit is meant to attach to the land at all. This
aspect seems to be the controlling feature in the Maryland
cases. The second theory, the one which seems to be the
fundamental, necessary, and practical one, emphasizes in-
tent to show what land the restriction is meant to "touch
and concern". This necessity arises only where the grantor
conveys a part of the land, and retains a much larger tract
of land, or where the grantor owns several disconnected
tracts of land in the same vicinity as the part conveyed.
Intention looms large here as a practical matter. The bene-
fit or burden may be such that in its nature it touches and
concerns all the land, and unless the intention can be ascer-
tained, the restriction must, of necessity, be held to be in
gross. Where a grantor, owning only two lots which adjoin,
conveys one of them with mutual restrictions which inter
sese benefit and burden the respective lots, the question of
intent should be absent.
One of the clearest and most unmistakable ways of
showing intent is by the wording of the instrument itself.
The most appropriate method of showing intention in thisjurisdiction is by stating that the restrictions or benefits
therefrom are to bind the "assigns". This principal is
reflected throughout the Maryland cases, and it has been
stated that where assigns did not appear it was apparently
"Wood v. Stehrer, 119 Md. 143, 86 Atl. 128 (1912).
Summers v. Beeler, 90 Md. 474, 45 At. 19 (1899).
' Sowers v. Holy Nativity Church, 149 Md. 434, 131 Atl. 785 (1926).
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deliberately omitted." In the opinion of the writer the
Maryland court has overemphasized the importance of the
word "assigns." A number of cases have stated that if it
be the intention to bind the assigns, it must be so stated, or
that the intention must be shown from the instrument it-
self.29 Despite the statement of this inflexible rule, other
methods are recognized in this state-as shall be noted
later, surrounding circumstances may be an important fac-
tor. The fact that a restriction "touched and concerned"
the land would seem in itself an indication that the land,
and not the individual was intended to be benefited.
If the second theory of showing intention, that it is
necessary to determine what land will be benefited or re-
stricted, be the correct theory, it is hard to realize how the
word "assigns" is any key to the intent of the parties in
this respect. "Assigns" might go to show that some land
would be bound, but does not help determine whether all
the land in the vicinity owned by the grantor, whether con-
nected or separate from that conveyed, will be restricted or
benefited, or whether the restriction is to apply only to the
adjoining land.
The conclusion of our court is an application of the
third .rule in Spencer's case which early became firmly im-
bedded in the Maryland law. This requirement is deemed
by many writers and a number of jurisdictions to be due to
an incorrect report of the case, and which if given effect is
more properly a technical requirement of.the law courts.
In Halle v. Newbolds0 the court said "that a grantor may
impose a restriction in the nature of a servitude or ease-
ment, upon the land that he sells or leases, for the benefit of
the land he still retains; and if that servitude is imposed
upon the heirs and assigns of the grantee, and in favor of
the heirs and assigns of the grantor, it may be enforced by
an assignee of the grantor against the assignee (with no-
tice) of the grantee". The inference which has subsequently
been drawn from that statement is that the heirs and assigns
must be expressly, designated.
The theory that intention is necessary to determine
what land is to be bound rather that whether any land is
to be restricted or benefited is further evidenced by allow-
ing parties who purchase from a uniform subdivision to
enforce the agreements of their common grantor inter sese
"Wood v. Stehrer. supra, note 25, 119 Md. 143, 149.
Ross v. McGee, 'P8 Md. 389, 56 Atl. 1118 (1904) ; Halle v. Newbold, 69
Md. 265, 14 Atl. 662 X1888) ; Md. & Pa. R1. R. Co. v. Silver, 110 Md. 510, 73
At. 297 (1910).
" Supra, note 29.
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whether or not the "assigns" are designated. The exist-
ence of a uniform subdivision shows what land is intended
to be restricted, so that a purchaser may feel reasonably
sure that for a number of feet or blocks he will not be dis-
turbed by any business enterprises, that all the houses in
his block conform to a certain pattern or that he will have
an unobstructed view within certain territorial limits. The
emphasis seems to be on what land the restrictions and
benefits are to apply.
The case of Wood v. Steirer"1 presents an insight into
the emphasis on "assigns". The grantor conveyed a lot
150 by 90 feet covenanting that he would not convey his re-
maining land of equal size except subject to the same restric-
tions. The grantor died without conveying. His heirs con-
veyed without 'imposing the restrictions. The court held,
and correctly so, that the land was not restricted.
One of the reasons given by the court was the failure of
the grantor to bind his "assigns". An examination of the
wording of the agreement irrespective of the use of the word
"assigns" shows that it purported to be a personal under-
taking. In other words, the covenant did not "touch and
concern" the land. It did not purport to impose a burden
upon it at that time, but created a personal agreement on
the part of the grantor that he would burden his land if and
when he conveyed. If a burden is an equitable servitude it
must in the nature of its terms create a servitude and the
words heirs and assigns cannot accomplish that effect. As-
suming that the covenant had been such as to create an
equitable servitude, the first grantee might have gone to
considerable trouble and expense carrying out the servitude
which had been imposed by the grantor upon the grantee's
land, only to find that grantor had conveyed the remaining
lot without imposing the restrictions, leaving the first
grantee without an equitable remedy against the purchaser
of the remaining lot because the grantee had failed to re-
quire that the assigns be designated.
In Ringgold v. Denhardt"2 the grantor had subdivided her
land and built a number of houses according to a plan im-
posing in the deeds a covenant against building out-build-
ings, but did not designate the benefit to be for her "as-
signs". She sold a lot to the defendant subject to the
restrictions. Other lots of the grantors were sold free from
restrictions. There was not sufficient evidence of a general
Supra, note 25.
2 Supra, note 22.
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plan. The grantor died, the son either by inheritance or
purchase became the owner of the remaining lots. Held, the
benefit was in gross, the son could not restrain because
"assigns" had not been designated. The conclusion was
correct, but could not the result have been placed upon the
grouncl that there was no showing of an intent on the part
of the grantor as to which of her land was to be benefited.
Had a number of other purchasers whose land was not
restricted built according to their own desires, could it be
contended that the mere use of "assigns" gave the son a
right to restrain the sole owner whose land was restricted?
It would seem not. There was no way of showing what
remaining land was intended to be benefited-therefore, the
benefit was intended to be in gross.
From surveying the Maryland cases one gets the im-
pression that the court is prompted by sound public policy
in construing covenants strictly, and in requiring intent to
be clearly shown in order to bind subsequent grantees. The
court reasons that a grantor may by omitting the word
"assigns" intend only to bind himself so as not to hinder
him from disposing of his remaining property, since he
wishes only to benefit himself as he no longer has an interest
to protect after he has conveyed. This policy of equity
exists to keep the land as free and unencumbered as pos-
sible in favor of future purchasers. This is reflected in the
principal case wherein the court quotes from Himmel v.
Hendler. After stating that restrictive covenants are in
derogation of the natural right which the owner of the
property has to use as he sees fit, the court adds: "There-
fore, one of the cardinal canons of construction when dealing
with such covenants is to construe them strictly against the
person in whose favor they are made, and liberally in favor
of the freedom of the land."
A definite public policy is further reflected by the fact
that technical requirements are not essential to show intent
when the rights of purchasers in a uniform subdivision are
involved. Restrictions are more favored here because pur-
chasers expect to benefit by the uniformity of the plan.
Where there is no uniformity of plan the court is induced
to keep the land as free and unencumbered as possible by
making the technical requirements for the creation of equit-
able easements more strict.
Maryland follows another sound policy in holding that
once the grantor has divested himself of all interest in the
remaining land, he no longer has sufficient interest in the
covenants he has imposed to give him standing in a court of
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
equity to procure their enforcement8 However, from this,
it could well be argued that the benefit, provided it touched
and concerned the land, would therefore cling to the land
even though the assigns were not bound. It seems an
anomaly to -hold a benefit enforceable only while the
grantor remained on the land, and to treat that benefit as a
personal one only.
The final problem for consideration concerns the rights
of grantees of a number of lots to enforce inter sese restric-
tions imposed by their grantor. A sharp distinction must
be drawn here between the rights of a prior purchaser
against a subsequent purchaser, and the broader rights of
a subsequent purchaser against a prior purchaser. In order
for the subsequent purchaser to enforce restrictive cove-
nants against a prior purchaser he must show first that the
covenant "touches and concerns" his land. Next, he must
show that the covenantor and covenantee intended to confer
the benefit upon his land. This can be shown by the lan-
guage of the covenant itself-if the common grantor re-
served the benefit to his remaining land, and not merely to
himself, a subsequent grantee of all or part of this remain-
ing land can enforce the restriction against the prior
grantee. A clear indication that the grantor is reserving
the benefit for his land, can best be shown, as already noted,
by binding the assigns. However, if a natural interpreta-
tion of the language shows that intent, the assigns need not
be designated. If the common grantor has failed to make
the intent appear in the instrument itself, the subsequent
purchaser may still enforce the restriction against a prior
purchaser providing the grantor has inserted similar restic-
tions in all of his conveyances of the remaining lots. This
shows the intention that all the lots are to be equally bene-
fited and restricted. When a subsequent purchaser of one
lot enforces these restrictions against the prior purchaser
of another lot the theory is that these benefits were for any
subsequent purchaser who purchased with notice, and that
the appearance of the restrictions were an inducement to
the purchase.
s The following cases deal with the general subject of enforcement inter
sese. Halle v. Newbold, 8upra, note 29; Newbold v. Peabody Heights Co.,
note 17; Summers v. Beeler, supra, note 26; Wood v. Stehrer, supra, note
25; Lowes v. Carter, supra, note 20; Ringgold v. Denhardt, 8upra, note 22;
Boyd v. Park Realty Corporation, 137 Md. 36, 111 Atl. 129 (1920); Beal-
mer v. Tippett, 145 Md. 568; 125 Atl. 806 (1924) ; Sowers v. Holy Nativity
Church, 8upra, note 27; Clem v. Valentine, supra, note 10; Klels v. Katcef,
160 Md. 627; 154 Ati. 558 (1931) ; Bartell v. Senger, 160 Md. 685, 155 Ati.
174 (1931) ; Himmel v. Hendler, 161 Md. 181, 155 Atl. 316 (1931).
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However, when a prior purchaser attempts to enforce a
restriction against a subsequent purchaser another theory
must be advanced because it can hardly be said that the
future restrictions were an inducement to the prior pur-
chase. Therefore, the prior purchaser must show more than
the fact that the agreement between the grantor and the
subsequent purchaser were entered into for his benefit before
this. benefit can enure to his advantage. He has the burden of
showing that when he purchased his lot, he had the expecta-
tion of having benefits conferred upon him in the future. If
at the time the prior grantee purchased his land, the grantor
burdened his remaining land, and not merely burdened him-
self personally, the prior grantee has at hand in the wording
of the grant, the proof of his expectation, and any subse-
quent purchaser of the remaining land will take subject to
this restriction if he has notice, either actual or constructive.
On the other hand, if the grantor fails to burden his remain-
ing land, the prior grantee has one remaining method of
proving this expectation-this can be proved by showing
that the land of the grantor was advertised as a restricted
uniform subdivision. The mere existence or future develop-
ment of a subdivision with equal restrictions is not enough
to show this expectation.
The holding of the principal case is undoubtedly correct.
Any of the other lot holders would be in the position of a
prior grantee in attempting to impose restrictions on the
plaintiffs' lot. In each of the restrictions placed in the
three grants south of Slade Avenue exclusive of the plain-
tiff's lot, there was no covenant on the part of the grantor
to hold the remaining land subject to the same restrictions.
The grantor placed a restriction on the lots sold without
imposing a reciprocal obligation on the land retained by
him. Due to the variations in the restrictions placed upon
the three lots sold, there was no evidence of a uniform plan.
Had the restrictions been similar in the three lots sold, the
prior grantees in order to impose the restrictions on the
plaintiff's lot would have to show an expectation to benefit
by similar restrictions in subsequent grants. Mere existence
or development of the uniform plan would not have been
sufficient. A prior grantee must show that he purchased
from an advertised uniformly restricted subdivision or that
the grantor had imposed reciprocal obligations on the land
retained by him. Neither of these elements was present
here. At the most the grantor burdened these prior grants,
and retained to himself, or the land remaining, a benefit.
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Some of the facts in the case afford excellent opportunity
for speculation. In granting the first lot on the north of
Slade Avenue the parties covenanted for themselves, their
heirs and assigns that the land granted should be subject to
certain restrictions, which should "apply to the whole tract
of land" north of Slade Avenue. Quaere, had the suit in-
volved land north of Slade Avenue, and had the word "heirs
and assigns" been omitted would the other terms have been
sufficient to establish the burden and the benefit on the
remaining land or would they have been held to be in gross?
It would seem here that the term to "apply to the whole
tract" north of Slade Avenue would have been sufficient
expression of intent without the use of the word "assigns."
In conclusion two interesting rules present themselves.
In the principal case the Court said: ". . . that where the
covenants in a conveyance are not expressly for or on be-
half of the grantor, his heirs and assigns, they are personal
and will not run with the land, but that, if in such a case it
appears that it was the intention of the grantors that the
restrictions were part of a uniform general scheme or plan
of development and which should affect the land granted
and the land retained alike, they may be enforced in equity."
If the first part of the rule was intended to be an expression
of the Maryland law as laid down in previous cases in re-
gards to covenants running with the land in general, in
both law and equity, it would seem somewhat inaccurate.
The court says if the assigns are not designated, the cove-
nants will not run with the land. This statement apparently
overlooks two angles as developed in former cases. First,
if the covenant relates to something in e sse, it is not neces-
sary to bind the "assigns". Second, in the recent case of
Union Trust Co.- v. Rosenburg" a covenant was held to run
with the land at law despite the fact that the thing was not
in esse (a covenant to pay taxes), and despite the fact that
the heirs and assigns were not designated. The rule as thus
stated can be readily explained. The majority of cases aris-
ing in equity have dealt with restrictive covenants wherein
the thing concerned was not in esse, and the court in men-
tioning the necessity for "assigns" had no occasion to desig-
nate the rule for things which were in esse; and, as this case
arose in equity, the majority of the cases reviewed by the
court were equity decisions.
An excellent statement of what the writer believes to be
a summary of the law as laid down in Maryland cases de-
cided both before and since the statement was made, as
a' Supra, note 5.
CHILD'S DINING HALL CO. v. SWINGLER
regards enforcing restrictive covenants in equity, was form-
ulated by Judge Digges in Clem v. Valentine," wherein he
succinctly stated:
"As a result of the examination of the many cases
involving this question, and the reasons which the courts
have assigned for reaching their conclusions, we are of
the opinion that the application for relief in such cases
is addressed largely to the conscience of the court and
is governed by equitable principles; that if the language
of the covenant, the respective positions of the parties,
and the surrounding circumstances, taken singly or to-
gether, show that the covenant was entered into for the
benefit of the land retained by. the covenantee, creating
on equity or right appurtenant to the land, to be exer-
cised by such person as for the time being is the owner
thereof, it will be enforced, without regard to whether
the covenant does or does not run with the land con-
veyed, or whether or not it is a general scheme or plan
of development of the property in question.
THE DOCTRINE OF IMPLIED WARRANTY
BETWEEN RESTAURANT-KEEPER
AND GUEST
Child's Dining Hall Co. v. Swingler1
Plaintiff-appellee ordered a crabcake sandwich in a
restaurant operated by defendant-appellant, and was served
it at a table in that restaurant. As she was eating the last
remaining small piece of the bread she bit down on a piece
of tin which was imbedded in the bread. The piece of tin
lodged between her teeth, was later removed, but caused an
abscess which necessitated removal of a tooth, and caused
severe shock and pain. The suit was originally framed in
tort but was amended to assumpsit, alleging an express
warranty, and at the trial, to meet the proof, a second
amended declaration alleging an implied warranty was
filed. The lower court granted plaintiff's implied war-
ranty prayer, and refused defendant's demurrer prayer.
From a judgment for the plaintiff, defendant appeals. Held,
two judges dissenting: Reversed and remanded. No im-
85 Supra, note 10, 155 Md. 19, 28.le A collection of excerpts from Maryland cases is found In Best, Re-
strictions and Restrictive Covenants.
1197 AtI. 105 (Md. 1938).
